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IN THE SUPREME COURT
, OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN 0. FARNS,VORTH and
SHARON ANNETTE FARNSWORTH, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
SOTER'S INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
11626

ROBERT B. S'V ANEil and LOUISE
S. S'V ANER, his wife, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, a body politic, and SAl\1 F.
SOTER, individually,
Third-Party Defendants and
Respondents.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

This is an action for damages for the loss of
removing and tearing up a well-established road from
the front of plaintiffs' property and platting lots in the
1

road thereby denying the plaintiff access to the road
leaving them landlocked with the one-acre piece. There.
by depriving the plaintiffs' of the use of two building
lots abutting the road. All done without any legal
process to the plaintiffs or any notice of the proposed
change. The plaintiffs asked that in the alternative
to damages, the road be restored for use by plaintiffs.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a judge sitting without a :
jury and from a judgment of dismissal against the
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs now appeal.
1

:

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs and appellants seek a reversal of the ',
judgment and request judgment in their favor as a
matter of law, or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff John Farnsworth purchased a farm ':
of almost 120 acres (R. 3-185) from Chris and Flor·
ence Stoven in June of 1943 (R. 20 & 22 170) (War·
ranty Deed Exhibit P-4). That he first saw the prop·
erty in May or June in 1943 (R. 14-180). At the time
of purchase there was a road in front of the property
(R. 29-180) which had been used for quite some time
and had been established as a County Road (R. 181)

1
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known as the Little Cottonwood Creek Road shown
in aerial photograph (Exhibit P-5). (Photo taken 816-46) (R.18-185).
The road in front of plaintiffs' property remained
essentially the same as at time of purchase until May
or June of 1964 at which itme it was torn out by the
defendant Soters, Inc. That in about 1959 the "bypass road" was built (R. 24-185) to avoid the bad
turn to the north which was in the old road and was
east of plaintiffs' property. The old road was left in
front of the plaintiffs' and Jessop's property (Mrs.
Jessop being the plaintiff's sister to whom he had
transferred the property immediately to the west of
his property and on which she lived ( T. 188-11 ) . The
bypass road was used by the majority of the public
but the old road abutting the plaintiffs' property was
used constantly by some people including Mrs. Jessop
and family until the road was torn up in May or June
of 1964 ( T. 187-11) and the school bus. It was impossible to use it after that.
The plaintiffs had the sewer put into their property in 1963 and a manhole was put in in the street
in front of the plaintiff's property and sister was
hooked on it.
The plaintiff sold the 120 acre farm he owned with
the exception of the piece he sold to his sister and the
piece he retained for himself to Happy Valley Incorporated (T. 193).

3

The property of the plaintiffs being surrounded
by Willow Creek Country Club Estates (T. 193-14)
which are built around the country club. There is a ,
road south of the property which does not abutt plain- i
1
tiffs' property known as Rubidoux Road, but which
is separated from their property by a protective strip
about three feet wide over which they were not per. I
mitted to pass (see Exhibit P-2).
The plaintiffs' land is surrounded on three sides
with no access to a road and on July 29, 1964, and
recorded July 30, 1964, the County Commission ap- :
proved a subdivision for Soter's Incorporated for the ·
property immediately to the north where the old road i
had previously run past plaintiffs' land, which closed in
the land on all four sides leaving no means of ingress
or egress to the land at all (Exhibit P-1).
1

That prior thereto, on September 17, 1958, the
County Commission had authorized the issuance of
a deed to Robert Swaner and wife granting him the
County's interest in the old roadway in exchange for
a new right of way at 8200 South and Cottonwood
Creek, and he quitclaimed to the County (See minutes
of meeting - Exhibit D-17). The County Commission
on the 29th day of May, 1964, transferred the title to
Sam F. Soter (Exhibit D-15) who, the same day,
transferred the title to Soters Inc. (Exhibit D-24),
the present title holder. That all of said transfers and
agreements were made without any notice being re·
ceived or given to the plaintiffs or the Jessops who were
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the only other persons concerned with the right of way.
The Jessops were left part of the road in front of
their place and have means of access into their home.
Neither the County, the defendants the Sommers,
nor the defendant Soter's Inc. ever gave any warning
as to the removal of the road even though the County
was warned by Mr. Oscar McConkie, an attorney employed by the Jessops (R. 249-256), and even though
the County did not give Mr. McConkie the courtesy
of an answer, Soter's Inc. just went ahead and destroyed the road (R. 187 & 208).
The plaintiffs intended to build a home on part
of the property and they are now precluded from doing
so because of the situation.
There is testimony as to the worth of the property
given by an expert witness, Nathan Smith, which
would indicate that the loss of the value of the land
would be $12,500.00 (R. 225) based on the loss of
access on the highest possible use. Mr. Smith testified
that the loss would be $11,240.00 on the cost of cure
basis to restore the property to its former value by
repairing the roads and accesses (R. 226).
The counsel stipulated that a Mr. Verl Smart, a
school bus driver, would testify that he drove around
the particular area in question up until the barrier was
put in in 1964.

5

ARGUMENT

Point 1. THAT THE PLAINTIFF \VAS 1
DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE ,
PROCESS OF LAW OR CO_MPENSATION.
In this particular instance the plaintiffs were deprived
of access to an established highway which had abutted
their property for many years, by destruction of the
road by the defendant and without any notice, legal
action, nor receipt of any compensation therefor contrary to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of
)
the Constitution of the United States providing
i.
"Private property is not to be taken for use :)
without just compensation."

Am J ur 2nd 26 Eminent Domain p. 812. At page 823 )
of the same title and volume states

"As a general rule, there is a taking of prop- '
erty within the meaning of the constitutional
provision 'nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation,' where
the act involves an actual interference with, or
disturbance of, property rights, as distinguished
from injuries which are merely consequential or
incidental, . . . "
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah
Article I, Sec. 7, provide that property cannot be taken
without due process of the law. This is shown at section
376 Eminent Domain of Vol. 27 Am J ur 2nd p. W
which states, among other things,

6

"Inasmuch as both federal and state constitutions protect all persons from being deprived
of their property without due process of the law
and warrant equal protection of the law, proceedings to condemn property must be such as
not to violate these guaranties."
It further points out that no particular form or method
is guaranteed but "Its requirements are satisfied if he
has reasonable notice and opportunity to present his
claim or defense."

"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Here there was no notice or opportunity to be heard
and, in fact, it was not known about until the spring
of 1963 when, in truth, the Commission made the Agreement to give the street away in 1958.
The only question here remaining is whether the
road taken which abutted the plaintiff's land is properly for which the plaintiff should be compensated.
It is contended that the right of access is a property
right which must be taken by due process and the
plaintiffs must be fully compensated for the taking.
It is recognized in Arizona that such a taking requires compensation as shown in Fletcher v. State,
367 Pac. 2nd, 272, which states:

"Fletcher alleges error in not granting severance damages for loss of access. Trial conducted
on the theory that the loss of access was not compensable heid 'In view of our recent holdings
that either the destruction or the material im-

7

pairment of the access easement of an abutting
property owner to a controlled access highway
is compensable.' "
·
In Idaho, in the case of Johnson v. Boise City,
390 Pac. 2nd, 291, which was a case involving an access
the court staled :
'
"This court has consistently held that access
to a public way is one of the incidents of ownership of land bounding such right is appurtenant
to the land and is a vested right."
Quoted from Ferris v. City of Twin Falls, 347 Pac
2nd, 996, they cite numerous and sundry other Idaho
cases in support of this position.
In Utah, the case of J. Herbert Hansen and wife
v. Utah Road Commission, 14 U. 2nd 305, 383 Pac.
2nd 917. The court did not make an additional award
for loss of access but recognized that a loss of access
was a factor in the settlement of the case by stating
"Where right of access was appurtenant to the
property taken, damage resulting due to loss of ,
access from the half remaining portion of property was necessarily considered as a factor in
increasing the a ward of the land which was taken
under the instruction that properly owners were
entitled to the difference in the value of the remaining tract before and after taking and that
there was no existing easement to the remaining ,
land."
There had been a separate a ward for this case for the
severance.

8

-In the case of Bare v. Department of Highways,
401 Pac. 2d, 552, in Idaho, the court stated:
"'Ve have recognized that an abutting property owner's right of reasonable access to a public highway is a property right which may not
be taken by the state without just compensation. 'Vhen such property is taken without compensation, the owner may recover in an action
in inverse condemnation, the damages to his
property caused by the taking."
The 1953 Utah Code Annotated as Amended provides
in Title 27, Chapter 1, Section 2 that:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
In this particular instance, the evidence shows that
this had been used for more than ten years and had
become a public highway. This is supported by the
case of Morris v. Blunt, 49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127 which
states that

"Under this section, the highway, even though
it be over privately owned ground, will be deemed
dedicated or abandoned to the public use when
the public has continuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of 10 years, but such use must
be by the public."
While the next section provides that all highways
continue until abandoned by the County Commissioners
or other competent authority, it would seem that here
there has been such an abandonment as the County

9

traded this to Sommers and subsequently to the de.
fendant, Soter's Incorporated. This would be under
the police power. However, in the case of Hague\',
Juab County, 37 U. 290, 107 P. 249, it states
"While public may abandon street or highwav
insofar as it affects right of public therein, such
abandonment, however, will not affect rights of
abutting owner with respect to use of easement
he may have in street for purposes of ingress and
egress to and from his premises."
Also, in the case of Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 U. 501, 126

P. 959.

"While highway by abandonment may
out of jurisdiction of local authorities, rights of
abutting owners will not be affected."
In other words, even though the County deeded by
quitclaim whatever right it had in the road,
Incorporated took subject to all the plaintiffs' right!
in the road as to right of "access" and property right.
Under Title 27, Chapter 1, Section 7, the law
provides, among other things,
"A transfer of land bounded by a highway
passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway."
In this particular instance, while the highway was not
on land described in the deed to the plaintiff, but was
in the area of the land which eventually came down to
the Sommers, and from them to Sam Soter and Soter's
Inc., still there was an established right of way for the

10

public use when plaintiff received this land by deed
in 1943 and he had a property right to the middle of the
street.
In 47 A.L.R. 902 under an Annotation - Power
to Deny Abuttter Access to Street or Highway, it
states
"Regardless of whether the fee of the street
or highway is in the abutting owners or in the
public, such an owner has a special easement
therein for purposes of ingress and egress, which
is property as much as the abutting lot itself, and
which cannot be taken away or materially impaired or interfered with, even under legislative
authority, without compensation to him therefor."

This annotation further goes on to quote the case of
Anzalone v. Metropolitan District Commission of the
Common Wealth in Massachusetts 153 N.E. 325
"The court in the reported case declares the
right of access to the highway to be one of the
incidents of the ownership of the abutting property, whether the fee of the highway is in the
municipality or in private ownership; and without denying the right of the commission to make
reasonable regulations as to the place and size
of the approach, does deny its power altogether
to exclude the abutting owner from access to the
highway . . . "

This case is reported on page 897 of the same
volume and further states at 902
"The exercise of a legal right may be regu-

11

lated but it is not to be taken away without legislative action."
This also points out at 901
"That if land adjacent to a roadway ...
should be divided into lots in separate ownership, each owner would have a right of access
from his lot to this roadway."
This is directly comparable to the case in question
where the plaintiff had sufficient land to make two lots
on the north end and which abutted the roadway which
was vacated. This road would have served both lots.
In volume 43 A.L.R. 2d p. 1072 treats on the subject
"Abuttipg owner's right to damages or other
relief for loss of access . . . "
Under section three on page 1074, it states
"Where an established 'land-service road,' in
which the normal right of access had already
come into being, is converted into a limitedaccess way in such a manner that the existing
right of access are destroyed, the owners of such
rights are entitled to compensation, exactly as
they would be if such rights were destroyed by
any other type of construction."
and states, among other cases, People v. La Macchia
quoted on page 1075
" ... the conversion of a highway to a freeway:
the right of access from various landowners
properties was strictly limited, the court, ap·
proving an award of compensation which includ·
ed a substantial amount for impairment of the

12

pre-existing right of access, held that no rever·
sible error arose from an instruction stating that
the owner of abutting land had a private righi
in such highway, distinct from that of the public,
for the purpose of access to his land."
Also, in the Department of Public 'Vorks and Buildings v. Wolf, 111 NE2d 322
"It was held that pre-existing rights of access
to a highway would not be taken by the mere
action of the state in declaring the highway a
freeway and posting freeway signs along the
boundary of the property, the court saying that
such rights constituted valuable property which
could not be taken without compensation."

This annotation recognizes and brings out the fact
that impairment of access or circuity of travel will not
give rise to compenstaion. In this particular instance,
the court cited the Springville Bank v. State of Utah
as support for its position. However, this was clearly
in line with the circuity of travel for access and, in the
opinion of the plaintiff, the law established was not
applicable to the instant case.
As a further supplement to the annotation, in Volume 4 of the A.L.R. 2d, Later Case Service, the annotation which is found on page 903, the court cites various and sundry cases in numerous jurisdictions, among
others, the following:
"Property owner abutting upon public street
or highway has property right in nature of ease-

13

ment of ingress and egress to and from his property and such right cannot be taken from him
without just compensation. Taking of easement
of access to public highways is compensable in
terms of severance damages, that is, in terms
of diminution in value of property which for.
merly had easement of access. People by Department of Public 'V orks v Renaud, 198 Cai
App 2d 581, 17 Cal Rptr 67 4." Also
"Right of access in and to street or highwav
attached to abutting lands which is a propert),
right and cannot be taken for public use without
just compensation. Such right of access is justified upon grounds of necessity and is such as
is reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the
land for all purposes to which it is adapted, subject, however, to reasonable regulations of state
highway commission with respect to entrances.
Riddle v. State Highway Com., 184 Kan 608,
339 P2d 301." Again
"Access easements appropriated by state for
construction of parkway are property and are
protected by state constitutions from being taken
without just compensation. Gilmore v State,
208 Misc 427, 143 NY S2d 873." .Further
"Real property consists not alone of tangible
things but also of certain rights therein sane·
tioned by law, such as right to access, ingress,
and egress, and owners of property abutting .a
street or highway cannot be deprived by pu.bhc
authorities of all access thereto without .iust
compensation, since such deprivation
to a taking of the property. Iowa State
way Com. v Smith (Iowa) 82 N'V2d 755.
"Reconstruction of highway which renders

14

abutting landowner's property less accessible to
highway, or approach less convenient, constitutes taking of valuable property right which is
compensable. Mississippi State Highway Com.
v Finch (Miss.) ll4 So 2d 673."
"Right of owner of property abutting on public highway to ingress and egress when portion
of property is taken by state under power of
eminent domain as right of way for limitedaccess highway is property right which is protected by S 14 of the state constitution and cannot
be taken or damaged without just compensation. Chandler v Hjelle (ND) 126 NW2d 141."
"If a free way is built in such a manner as to
deny a landowner any access to such highway
where he theretofore had full access to a conventional highway, then unquestionably his right
of access has been taken from him, and taker
must pay him for such property right. His loss
is generally shown by the before-and-after market value of the property. Pennysavers Oil Co.
v State (Tex Civ App) 334 S-\V2d 546, error
ref."
This also cites on the impairment of access a number
of cases which have given the owner of the property
compensation for mere circuity of access and we cite
the following:
"One whose right of access from his property
to abutting highway is cut off or substantially
interfered with by vacation of closing of road
is entitled to damages. Ent if his access is not
so terminated or obstructed, if he has same
access to highway as he did before the closing,
his damage is not special, but of same kind,

15

although it may be greater in degree, as that of
publi?,
he has lost no property right
for which he is entitled to compensation. 'Varren
v Iowa State Highway Com. (Iowa) 93
60."
"Notwithstanding availability of frontage
road from which property owner's abutting property had circuitous access to main thoroughfare
at remote interchanges, owner suffered compensable damage if highway to which he previously had immediate and unlimited access was
rebuilt on existing right of way in manner which
denied him reasonably convenient and suitable
access to main thoroughfare in at least 1 direction. Hendrickson v State, 267 Minn 436, 127
NW2d 165 (citing annotation)."
In a book put out by the American Association
of State Highway Officials entitled "Acquisition for
Right-of-Way," 1962 Edition, with respect to Highway Access, it states in Chapter 10, page 112
"At the earlier stages of highway development in America, the landowners bore most of
the burden of constructing and maintaining pub·
lie roads. Highways were built to serve the land
-to provide a means of getting to and from the
land. Naturally, with the shift in the character
of travel, the burden of providing a highway
system soon shifted to the government. How·
ever, the rights of the abutter, that were generated at the time when the provisions of roads
were the responsibility of the property owner
and were built to serve the landowner, still per·
sisted.
The rights which the abutting owner or oc·
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cupant has in the existing conventional highway,
in addition to the right of passage shared with
the general public, are the right of access, air,
light and view. These rights accrue to the abutting land because the original function of the
conventional highway was to serve the land as
well as the motorist and his vehicle. The right
of access includes the right of the abutter to
ingress and egress from his premises. This
right is appurtenant to the land and accrues to
an occupant of abutting land as well as to the
owner, and accrues even if the property is vacant.
It is immaterial whether the State owns the fee
in the highway or only an easement for highway
purposes. The right of the abutter has been defined as an easement in the highway which is as
much a property right as the land itself to
which it pertains.
These cases are supported by numerous and sundry
cases cited in the foot notes on pages 130 and 131. On
page 114 of the same volume, states

"Under the police power, vehicular access may
be reduced to a minimum; but an abutting owner
may not be completely deprived of all ingress
to and egress from his property."
"As has been suggested, access may be regulated to some extent under the police power. On
the other hand, the power of government to deny
access altogether is
by the constitutional requirement that compensation be paid
for the taking (and in some States, the damaging) of property.
As has been indicated, the courts have considered the right of access to be a property right

17

appurtenant to the land abutting the highway.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court has
it in Elizabethtown, Lexington and Big Sand
Railroad, 17 Ky 382, 19 Am Rep. 76
'The private right of the lot-owner in the adjacent street being conceded to be property, sueh
appropriation or obstruction of the street as
deprives him of its reasonable use deprives him
to that extent of his property, and no reason
is perceived why this species of property can
be taken without just compensation rather than
any other.'
An examination of the judicial decisions
wherein the abutter has claimed compensation on
constitutional grounds reveals that the courts are
substantially in agreement as to the rules of
law which apply, though there is some variation '
among the jurisdictions as to its application to
particular fact situations.
Before an abutter is entitled to compensation
for the impairment of his access rights, he must
show that he suffers a special injury, differin!(
in kind and not merely in degree from that sul- ,
fered by the public in general."
"The abutter is not entitled to access at all
points of his property, and as long as a suitable
means of access is left to him, he has suffered
no legal injury. But in cases where the obstruc·
tion deprived the abutter of a 'suitable' means
of access or where impariment of access resulted
in loss of value of the property, the abutter has
been awarded compensation. In such situations.
the abutter is deemed to have suffered a special
injury differing from that suffered by the geu·
eral public. Of course, where all access is com·
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pletely cut off and the owner is left landlocked,
the abutter must be comnensated since this is a
taking of the property right of access.
It is true that a person cannot recover compensation for a loss unless he has suffered damage. Here
a yery experienced real estate appraiser testified to the
amount of the damage. In assessment of the damages,
the State Highway Officials book, as previously cited,
sets forth a good guide in Chapter 4, page 33,

Market Value
"Fair cash market value is the normally accepted standard for the measure of compensation. It is generally stated that fair cash market
value is the amount of money which a purchaser,
willing but not obligated to buy the property,
would pay to an owner willing but not obligated
to sell it, taking into consideration all uses to
which the land was adopted and might in reason
be applied." Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd
Edition, Vol. 4, Section 12.2 ( 1)
"Present and Anticipated Use
In determining the fair cash market value of
the property taken, the owner is not limited to
the value of the property for the purposes for
which it was actually used. The value of property should be based upon its most profitable
legal use. Any reasonable future use to which
the land might be adopted or applied may be
considered in arriving at the present market
value. This is distinguished and separate from
the owner's vague plans or hopes for the future
which are completely irrelevant." Nichols, Sec.
12.314.
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"The value of property for the use to which
reasonable men would devote it if owned by
them must be taken as the ultimate test."
Nichols
" 'Before and After' Rule
When only a portion of the land is taken, the
better rule of valuation seems to be the 'before
and after' method. This consists of determining
the difference between the market value of the
entire property before the taking and its value
after the taking." Jahr Eminent Domain, Valuation and Procedure, Section 98. "It has the ad.
vantage of eliminating the double compensation
problem by simply subtracting the value of the
remainder after the taking from the value of the
whole before the taking. It has the disadvantage, .
however, of being susceptible to padding, since
noncompensable items of damages can be wrong·
fully reflected in the estimated after value, and
thus may be included as part of the purported
severance damages. The other rule accepted by
the courts in partial taking cases is the deter·
mination of the value of the land taken, together
with the severance damage to the remainder,
without going into the entire tract value before
and after the taking."
Here there was no contrary evidence presented so the
evidence of damage would have to stand.
The defendants set up as a defense the doctrine
of estoppel and laches and included this in their motion
for dismissal. However, this would be or no force and
effect as the statute provides that for a four year statute
of limitations to bring the action. The defendants
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have contended because the trade was originally made
by Sommers with the County in 1958 that the time
should start running as of that time. However, the
trade and quitclaim deed as executed in 1958 were
not a denial of access and the denial came in 1964 as
shown by all of the evidence when there was an actual
tearing up of the road and until there was an actual
taking of the road, the right would not arise as there
would have been no damages prior to that time.
It is noted in the cases cited previously, that the

governing body can dispose of its right in a highway
but this does not affect the abutting property owners'
right in the highway, so mere transfer of the title
would not be a denial of access and hence the judge
would have been in error if he had based his motion
on the doctrine of laches and estoppel.
In vacating a right of way prior to 1965, there was
no specific m ethod set forth as to how this should be
done, but in 1965 the Legislature specifically set forth
in Title 27, Chapter 12, Section 102.4 of the 1953
Utah Code Annotated as amended, which provides for
means of notice and sets up the specific steps required,
none of which were fallowed in this particular case. As
pointed out in cases previously cited, the way it was
handled does not even comply in any sense of the word
with the requirement of the constitutional provision
for due process.
It is noted that there was no evidence at all presented on behalf of the defendants so that all the testi-
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mony for the plaintiffs would have to be assumed tu
be true and construed in the most liberal manner iii
their favor and we contend, when applying the law
to the facts as presented to the court, that it is very
clear that there was a property right taken
compensation and without due process.

Point Two. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
PERMITTING THE CASE TO BE TRIED
BEFORE A JURY.
It is noted that on the 14th of February, 1969, the
plaintiffs gave notice of the calling of a jury trial and
paid the jury fee therefor. That thereafter the defendants gave notice of their objection to the calling of a
jury and their motion was heard on the 25th of February, 1969, at which time the objection to the calling
of a jury was sustained through the shortness of notice.
Please note that the matter was set for February 2G,
1969, and had been delayed on numerous and sundry
occasions by efforts of the defendants to get all of their
parties in to the point where it was hard to determine
where, when and if this matter would be tried. It J)
noted that it was definitely set for November 25, 1968,
but that the setting was changed to February 26th
as shown in the notice dated the 25th day of November,
1968 (R. 132).

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants had
plenty of time and notice and were aware at all times
that this matter was to be tried before a jury so that
it did not take them by surprise and after notice, the)·
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had from the 14th to the 26th to prepare the case, and
based upon the calendars and the crowded manner in
which cases have to be pushed through in a day or two
notice, this would not have been as inconvenient as a
two-day notice of trial would have been and would not
have discommoded them.
While the matter of jury trial is somewhat discretionary matter with the presiding judge, still it
is such a fundamental procedure and right in American
jurisprudence that the right to a jury trial should not
be lightly denied. In some instances, parties have been
required to accept a jury without any notice whatsoever and so we believe that it was error to deny plaintiffs a jury trial.
CONCLUSION
From all of the cases cited and the law as almost
universally accepted throughout the various states of
the union, it is very clear and convincing that the
judgment of dismissal of the District Court was in
error. That the plaintiffs had a vested right in the
abutting road and that they could not be deprived of
the use of the road without due process of the law as a
taking of a property right without due process and
without compensation would be contrary to the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. That the
case should be remanded to the District Court with
instructions to continue the case and if the facts are
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as they now appear to be, that an award for damages
shou]d be made to the plaintiffs for the unlawful taking
in the amount of the market value of the property
taken.
Respectfully submitted,

LOTHAIRE R. RICH
No. 16 East Stratford Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
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